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THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF MARBURY
Michael Stokes Paulsen*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly all of American constitutional law today rests on a myth.
The myth, presented as standard history both in junior high civics texts
and in advanced law school courses on constitutional law, runs
something like this: A long, long time ago - 1803, if the storyteller is
trying to be precise - in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 the
Supreme Court of the United States created the doctrine of "judicial
review." Judicial review is the power of the Supreme Court to decide
the meaning of the Constitution and to strike down laws that the
Court finds unconstitutional.
As befits the name of the court from which the doctrine emanates,
the Supreme Court's power of judicial review - the power, in Chief
Justice John Marshall's famous words in Marbury, "to say what the
law is"2 - is supreme. The Congress, the President, the states indeed, "We the People" who "ordain[ ed] and establish[ ed] "3 the
Constitution - are all bound by the Supreme Court's pronounce
ments. Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court become, in effect,
part of the Constitution itself. Even the Supreme Court is bound by its
own precedents, at least most of the time. Occasionally the Court
needs to make landmark decisions that revise prior understandings, in
order to keep the Constitution up to date with the times. When it
does, that revised understanding becomes part of the supreme law of
the land. Other than through the adoption of a constitutional amend-

* © Copyright Michael Stokes Paulsen 2003. Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law,
University of Minnesota Law School. Graduate, John Marshall Elementary School (Wausau,
Wisconsin, 1 969). - Ed. Many people have influenced my thinking about Marbury v:
Madison over the course of the years - so many that it is impossible to thank them all indi
vidually (or even remember all of them). I nonetheless would like to give special thanks to
those who read and commented on this specific manuscript (Dan Farber, Casey Duncan,
Dale Carpenter, and John Nagle), to the other participants at this 200th anniversary sympo
sium, and to the editors of the Michigan Law Review.
The title of this Essay is inspired by John Hart Ely's The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). Professor Ely, who died this year, was one of the greatest consti
tutional scholars of our era. His thoughtfulness, insights, and good humor will long continue
to serve as an inspiration and model for other scholars, as they have for me.

1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
3. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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ment, however, the Supreme Court is the final authority on constitu
tional change.
Judicial review (the myth continues) thus serves as the ultimate
check on the powers of the other branches of government, and is one
of the unique, crowning features of our constitutional democracy. The
final authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution has
withstood the test of time. It has survived periodic efforts by the
political branches, advanced during times of crisis (the Civil War and
the Great Depression) or out of short-term political opposition to
initially unpopular or controversial rulings (like Brown v. Board of
Education4 and Roe v. Wade5), to undermine this essential feature of
our constitutional order. Through it all
Dred Scott and the Civil
War, the New Deal Court-packing plan, resistance to Brown, the
Nixon Tapes case,7 the Vietnam War, the quest to overrule Roe v.
Wade
the authority of the Supreme Court as the final interpreter of
the Constitution has stood firm. Indeed, the Court's authority over
constitutional interpretation by now must be regarded, rightly, as one
of the pillars of our constitutional order, on par with the Constitution
itself.
So the myth goes.
But nearly every feature of the myth is wrong. For openers,
Marbury v. Madison did not create the concept of j udicial review, but
(in this respect) applied well-established principles. The idea that
courts possess an independent power and duty to interpret the law,
and in the course of doing so must refuse to give effect to acts of the
legislature that contravene the Constitution, was well accepted by the
time Marbury rolled around, more than a dozen years after the
Constitution was ratified. Such a power and duty was contemplated by
the Framers of the Constitution, publicly defended in Alexander
Hamilton's brilliant Federalist No. 78 (as well as other ratification
debates), and well-recognized in the courts of many states for years
prior to Marbury.8
Moreover, and also contrary to the mythology that has come to
surround Marbury, the power of judicial review was never understood
by proponents and defenders of the Constitution as a power of judicial
supremacy over the other branches, much less one of judicial exclusiv-

-

4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. 410 U .S. 113 (1973).
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
7. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
8. See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 13-89 (1990) (setting forth pamphlets, legislative debates, and cases
accepting the doctrine of j udicial review from independence to Marbury); William Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-29 (explaining that
the argument for judicial review was familiar and accepted by the time of Marbury).
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ity in constitutional interpretation. Nothing in the text of the
Constitution supports a claim of judicial supremacy. The courts pos
sess "[t]he judicial Power of the United States"9 and that power ex
tends to "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,"10
but nothing in the logic or language of such a statement of constitu
tionally authorized judicial jurisdiction implies judicial supremacy over
the other branches of government. Jurisdiction to decide cases does
not entail special guardianship over the Constitution. (If anyone could
lay claim to the title of Special Trustee or Lord Protector of the
Constitution, it would be the President, for whom the Constitution
prescribes a unique oath that he will, "to the best of my Ability, pre
serve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.")11
None of the Constitution's authors or proponents ever suggested
that the Constitution provides for judicial supremacy over the other
branches in constitutional interpretation. All prominent defenses of
the Constitution at the time of its adoption explicitly deny - indeed,
take pains to refute - any such notion, which was sometimes charged
by opponents of ratification but never accepted by the document's
defenders.12
Nothing in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury makes
such a claim of judicial supremacy either. The standard civics-book
(and law school casebook) myth misrepresents and distorts what John
Marshall and the Framers understood to be the power of judicial
review: a coordinate, coequal power of courts to judge for themselves
the conformity of acts of the other two branches with the fundamental
9. U.S. CONST. art. I I I , § l.
10. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl.1 .
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. I do not claim that the President's oath makes him the
unique protector of the Constitution, vested with interpretive supremacy over the other
branches. I claim only that the judiciary is not the unique protector of the Constitution,
vested with interpretive supremacy over the other branches.
The correct answer, James Madison and I submit, is that none of the branches has inter
pretive supremacy over the others. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (James Madison)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("The several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the
terms of their ccmmon commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclu
sive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers.") For an
extended defense, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) [hereinafter, Paulsen, The Most
Dangerous Branch].
12. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1349-51 (1999) (hereinafter Paulsen, Nixon Now]
(collecting authorities). Alexander Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78 is a careful defense of
the propriety of judicial review while simultaneously an emphatic refutation of the
anti-Federalist writer Brutus's accusation of judicial supremacy. See Paulsen, Nixon Now,
supra, at 1350 n.39; id. at 1353-56 (collecting sources); see also GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 126-36 (1981). But cf JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND I DEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 1 86-87 (1997)
(intimating that Brutus, rather than Hamilton, may have correctly understood the judicial
supremacist implications of Article III of the Constitution).

·

August 2003]

The Irrepressible Myth

2709

law of the Constitution, and to refuse to give acts contradicting the
Constitution any force or effect insofar as application of the judicial
power is concerned.
That was a big enough deal in its own right. The idea that written
constitutions could serve as judicially enforceable checks on the
powers of legislatures elected by the people is an important, distinc
tively American, contribution to what the founding generation called
the science of politics.13 Written constitutionalism, combined with
separation of powers - including an independent judiciary deriving its
authority directly from the Constitution and not from the other
branches - yields an independent judicial power to interpret and
apply the Constitution in cases before the courts. That is the proposi
tion of Marbury v. Madison, and it is a proposition of considerable
significance (even if not original to the case).
But that proposition is nowhere close to a holding, or claim, of
judicial supremacy over the other branches - a notion that would
have been anathema to the founding generation, and that the Supreme
Court in Marbury appeared explicitly to disavow.14 Nothing in
Marbury supports the modem myth of judicial supremacy in interpre
tation of the Constitution. Quite the contrary, Marbury's holding of
judicial review rests on premises of separation of powers that are
fundamentally inconsistent with the assertion by any one branch of the
federal government of a superior power of constitutional interpreta
tion over the others.
The logic of Marbury implies not, as it is so widely assumed today,
judicial supremacy, but constitutional supremacy - the supremacy of
the document itself over misapplications of its dictates by any and all
subordinate agencies created by it. As a corollary, Marbury also stands
for the independent obligation of each coordinate branch of the
national government to be governed by that document rather than by
departures from it committed by the other branches. Under Chief
Justice John Marshall's reasoning (and Alexander Hamilton's before
him in Federalist No. 78), the duty and power of judicial review do not
mean the judiciary is supreme over the Constitution. Rather, the duty
and power of judicial review exist in the first place because the
Constitution is supreme over the judiciary and governs its conduct. As
Marshall wrote in Marbury, "the framers of the constitution contem
plated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well
as of the legislature."15

13. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 3, passim (1969).
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (disclaiming "all preten
sions to . . . j urisdiction" over matters in which political branches "have a discretion").
15. Marbury, 5 U.S. ( l Cranch) at 179-80.
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It is the fundamental betrayal of Marbury's premises and
logic that accounts for nearly all of what is wrong with
"constitutional law" today. The twin peaks of constitutional law today
are judicial supremacy and interpretive license. Marbury refutes both
propositions. Correctly read, Marbury stands for constitutional su
premacy rather than judicial supremacy. And constitutional supremacy
implies strict textualism as a controlling method of constitutional in
terpretation, not free-wheeling judicial discretion.
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. First, I will discuss John
Marshall's near-flawless argument for judicial review. This should be
familiar ground, but it is not. Marbury truly fits Mark Twain's defini
tion of a "classic": a work that everybody praises but nobody actually
reads.16 Marbury is invoked today for the myth it has become, not for
its actual reasoning and logic. I will challenge the reader to attend
closely to what Marbury actually says - the premises set forth; the
logic of the argument - and to shed the judicial supremacist precon
ceptions with which most modern readers, thoroughly corrupted by
the Myth of Marbury, come to the case. If one does so, I believe, one
will be forced to conclude that the case cannot bear a judicial su
premacist reading. Marbury stands instead for constitutional suprem
acy, judicial independence, interpretive coordinacy, and the personal
responsibility of all who swear an oath to support the Constitution to
be guided by their best understanding of the Constitution and not
pliantly to accede to violations of the Constitution by other govern
mental actors.
The second half of the Essay will then sketch the rather
remarkable - even stunning - but entirely logical implications of
Marbury's argument. Constitutional supremacy, interpretive coordi
nacy, and personal interpretive responsibility imply parallel duties of
truly independent constitutional interpretation - that is, interpreta
tion not controlled by the Supreme Court's decisions - by the execu
tive and legislative branches of the national government, by all judges
(irrespective of stare decisis), by juries, and even by agencies of state
government. In short, if Marbury's reasoning is right, nearly all of our
constitutional practice today is wrong.
Marbury's

16. Cf MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD
241 (1897). Akhil Amar has made the same observation. Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury,
Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 445
(1989).
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Marbury v. Madison is, of course, wrong about a great many
thingsY But on the essential point for which the case is justly
celebrated - the judiciary's power of independent constitutional
review of the lawfulness of acts of the other branches - Marbury's
premises are unassailable, its logic impeccable, and its rhetoric beauti
ful. All of which makes its contemporary betrayal so lamentable.
As has been noted by too many people to count, Chief Justice
John Marshall's opinion for the Court in Marbury is questionable,
perhaps even deliberately mischievous, on a number of points.18 But it
is hard to find fault in Marshall's proof for judicial review. In part, this
is because the argument was so well-rehearsed in the work of earlier
writers and prior j udicial opinions. Talent borrows and genius steals.
And John Marshall was undoubtedly a talented guy. In Marbury,
Marshall displays his skills as a subtle and gifted plagiarist, shamelessly
borrowing from Hamilton's The Federalist No. 78. But he does add his
own distinctive and important twist, as we shall see.
There are three core points to Marshall's argument for judicial
review in Marbury. They can be summarized briefly, but then deserve
attention in detail.
First, Marshall's absolutely foundational starting point is the prin
ciple of constitutional supremacy. Marshall finds this postulate inher
ent in the nature of written constitutionalism. It is reinforced by some
strongly supportive, specific textual provisions. It is not, however, an
argument that derives its forces from any particular provision, but
from the document as a whole. It is the fact of having a written consti
tution, and the nature of written constitutionalism, that does the work.
Marshall's second core proposition in Marbury is the interpretive
independence of the several branches of government, a consequence
that flows both from constitutional supremacy and, implicitly, from the
structural separation of powers of the various departments of govern-

17. For an irreverent look at the case, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Marbury's
Wrongness, 20 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Paulsen, Marbury's Wrong
ness].
18. The phrase that has caught on is Robert McCloskey's description of the opinion as a
"masterpiece of indirection," ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT
40 (1960), in which Marshall simultaneously criticized the Jefferson administration as
lawless; asserted the authority (in a proper case) to issue direct, coercive judicial orders to
executive branch officers (at least with respect to ministerial duties and at least with respect
to subordinate executive branch officers); avoided a direct confrontation with the President
(which the Court surely would have lost) by finding no jurisdiction to issue the requested
writ of mandamus to the Secretary of State; and in the process claimed the power of the ju
diciary to strike down acts of the legislature that the judiciary finds to violate the
Constitution. Sandy Levinson has characterized the opinion as "intellectually dishonest."
Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEXA S L. REV. 373, 389 (1982). Whether or not
Marshall was dishonest, a lot of what the opinion says would seem to be just plain wrong.
Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, supra note 17.

2712

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:2706

ment. Marshall's contention is that it would be utterly inconsistent
with the first principle of constitutional supremacy - indeed,
inconsistent to the point of absurdity - for one branch to be able to
bind another with its (by hypothesis) erroneous constitutional actions
or views.
The third proposition of Marbury reinforces the conclusion
following from the first two points, and it is Marshall's distinctive
contribution to the traditional argument for judicial review. The
obligation of the oath to support "this Constitution" requires that an
interpreter have direct, unmediated recourse to the Constitution.
Marshall's three arguments yield the specific conclusion of the
power of judicial review of legislative acts - the legitimate power of
courts to refuse to give effect to legislative acts that the courts find to
be in violation of a rule of law supplied by the Constitution. But his
arguments are fully generalizable: they equally support parallel
powers of constitutional review by each branch of the actions of the
others; and, moreover, they refute decisively any notion of judicial
supremacy.
Let us begin where Marshall does, with the postulate of constitu
tional supremacy. Marshall begins his argument for judicial review,
intriguingly, with the first principle of the American Revolution: the
right of the people to establish such principles for their own
self-government as they deem most conducive to their well-being, the
priority of those fundamental principles over the actions of govern
ment that depart from them, and the ultimate power of the people to
judge whether such departures have occurred and to take remedial
action. In a sense, the premises of the Declaration of Independence
thus parallel the premises of judicial review, and one can hear distinct
echoes of American revolutionary thought in the opening lines of
Marshall's argument in Marbury:
That the people have an original right to establish, for their future gov
ernment, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric has
been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion;
nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, there
fore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from
which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to
be permanent.19

This is the cornerstone from which Marshall proceeds. The
Constitution, as an original act of self-government by the supreme
authority - "We the People" - must be regarded as supreme law
limiting all government. This proposition is reinforced, later in the
Marbury opinion, by noting Article Vi's reference to the Constitution

19. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
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as "the supreme law of the land,"20 but it is, characteristically for
Marshall, a structural inference - a deduction from the nature of self
government and written constitutionalism, more than a specific text that establishes the postulate that the Constitution is supreme law.
Marshall continues:
This original and supreme will [that is, the People) organizes the gov
ernment, and assigns, to different departments, their respective powers.
It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended
by those departments.

The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation com
mitted to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those in
tended to be restrained? The distinction, between a government with lim
ited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not
confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and
acts allowed, are of equal obligation.21

Note how Marshall's argument is a general one, not necessarily limited
to legislative violations of the Constitution. The Constitution's alloca
tion of powers establishes "limits not to be transcended" by any of the
different departments. The powers of the legislature are defined and
limited in writing, but the same is of course true of the executive and
the judiciary. Those limitations are binding, or else written constitu
tionalism - the power of the People to establish limits on their gov
ernment agents - is abolished.
Marshall then draws the conclusion - deduces the theorem - that
legislative enactments that violate the Constitution are void, since the
only alternative is the unacceptable one of denying the supremacy of
the written Constitution:
It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls
any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the
constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitu
tion is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts,
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then writ
ten constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a
power, in its own nature illimitable.

20. Id .. at 180 (quoting, apparently, Art. VI, cl. 2 of the Constitution).
21. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added).
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Certainly all those who framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is
consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further
consideration of this subject. 22

This fundamental principle of constitutional supremacy is,
however, "lost sight of" in almost all further consideration of the
subject of judicial review by today's academics, judges, lawyers, and
students. They rush to a line that shows up a few paragraphs later in
the opinion - "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is"23 - but wrench it from context.
Marshall's argument, to this point, has been that the written
Constitution prevails over the inconsistent actions of government or
else the Constitution is meaningless. And this point (as I will develop
below) surely applies to the judiciary as well as the legislature. Indeed,
one can (and, in a moment, I will) repeat Marshall's argument to this
point, substituting the words "court" for "legislature" and "judicial
judgment" for "legislative act," with no change in the logic and flow of
the argument. And, of course, one can make precisely the same argu
ment for "president" and "executive action." Thus, it is a proposition
"too plain to be contested" that either the Constitution controls the
actions of the President and the decisions of the judiciary, or that the
President and Supreme Court may alter the Constitution by their or
dinary actions. If the Constitution is the "fundamental and paramount
law of the nation," then, under the logic of Marbury, the theory of our
government must be that "an act [of the President, or of th e courts],
repugnant to the Constitution, is void" in the same way as an act of the
legislature.
This principle, not "to be lost sight of in the further consideration
of this subject," helps to frame Marshall's second step in the argument
for judicial review in Marbury. That step is to ask whether the judici
ary must give effect to unconstitutional enactments of the legislature:
"If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does
it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to
give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it consti
tute a rule as operative as if it was a law?"24

22. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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This, Marshall says bluntly, would be ridiculous. It "would be to
overthrow in fact what was established in theory."2 5 It would be,
Marshall says (in one of my favorite judicial phrases of all time), "an
absurdity too gross to be insisted on."26
Is this because the Court, and not Congress, is designated as the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution? The next line in
Marbury is the oft-quoted one that many take as supporting such a
view: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart
ment to say what the law is."27 But this does not get one very far. It is
just a sonorous paraphrase of Hamilton's line in The Federalist No. 78
that "[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov
ince of the courts."28 Neither Marshall's version nor Hamilton's claims
exclusive or superior interpretive authority for the courts. Moreover,
often neglected are the immediately following sentences from the
same paragraph of Marbury, which explain why it is the province of
courts to say what the law is: "Those who apply the rule to particular·
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of
each."29 This is a far cry from a claim of judicial supremacy, It is
merely a statement that, when performing the judicial task calls for
deciding whether an act of Congress departs from the Constitution,
the courts are up to the task. It is within the judicial province to make
such a determination, and to make it independently of what Congress
has determined. (Remember: the whole point Marshall is trying to
make is that the courts are not bound by Congress's say-so - that this
would be an "absurdity too gross to be insisted on."30) Making those
types of determinations is no different in principle from the work
courts do all the time when faced with conflicting statutes (a point
Marshall also lifts straight from The Federalist No. 78).3 1 But it is
a huge and illogical stretch, one certainly not warranted by the
"emphatically the province" sentence and indeed quite inconsistent
with the rest of Marshall's argument, to move from the proposition
that the courts are competent to determine constitutional cases to the
proposition that the courts' views bind everybody else. The Myth of

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
29. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
30. Id.
31. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, at 439 (discussing judicial determination of the ef
fect of inconsistent laws - "it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning
and operation" - and its similarities and differences with judicial determination of the ef
fect of inconsistent constitutional and statutory provisions).
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Marbury is
Marbury.

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:2706

simply not very well grounded in the actual language of

In fact, the same arguments that Marshall uses to develop the
proposition of independent judicial interpretation tend to support the
conclusion that the other branches are similarly competent to interpret
the Constitution and likewise not bound by the erroneous interpreta
tions of their fellow branches:
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be
considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see
only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written consti
tutions. It would declare that an act, which, according to the principles
and theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com
pletely obligatory. It would declare, that if the legislature shall do what is
expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is
in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and
real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their
powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that
those limits may be passed at pleasure.32

Such a view, Marshall warns, "reduces to nothing what we have
deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions - a written
constitution." That, he says, is "sufficient, in America" to reject the
contention.33
What is truly arresting about Marshall's arguments here - at least
to eyes not conditioned to reading Marbury through judicial suprema
cist lenses and shut to what Marbury actually says - is that the exact
same reasoning would seem to apply with equal force to executive and
legislative constitutional review of the propriety of acts of the judici
ary. If the nature of a written constitution implies enforceable limita
tions on the powers exercised by the organs of government created
thereunder, it implies limitations on the powers of courts, as well as
Congress and the President. (Just a few paragraphs later, Marshall will
write that the Constitution is an instrument "for the government of
courts, as well as of the legislature."34) If requiring courts to carry out
acts of the legislature contrary to the limits set by the Constitution
"would overthrow in fact what was established in theory" and consti
tute "an absurdity too gross to be insisted on,'' so too in principle re
quiring the political branches to carry out decisions or precedents of
the courts contrary to the limits set by the Constitution likewise
would, absurdly, "overthrow in fact what was established in theory."

32. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 180.

·
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If the Constitution supplies rules and principles that Congress and
the President must apply in performing their duties, just as it supplies
rules and principles that courts must apply in performing theirs, are
Congress and the President permitted to interpret the Constitution
directly, or are they required to "close their eyes on the constitution"
and "see only" the decisions of the courts? Marbury says that such a
restriction, at least where urged on courts, "would subvert the very
foundation of all written constitutions."35 Why this would not equally
be true if the tables were turned is hard to answer, unless one were to
assume judicial infallibility and perfect will-less-ness by the courts. But
assuming that the courts might, like the legislature, misinterpret or
misapply the Constitution, to then require the political branches to be
bound by the courts' departure from the "fundamental and paramount
law of the nation" would similarly be to "declare that an act" - here,
an act of the judiciary - "which, according to the principles and
theory of our government, is entirely void; is yet, in practice, com
pletely obligatory."36 It would be to declare that if the courts do "what
is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibi
tion, is in reality effectual."37 It would be giving to the courts "a practi
cal and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to
restrict their powers within narrow limits."38 Indeed, such a doctrine
would, by Marbury's logic, "reduce[] to nothing what we have deemed
the greatest improvement on political institutions - a written consti
tution"!39
Alexander Bickel, writing more than forty years ago in his classic
book, The Least Dangerous Branch, made this same observation about
Marbury's logic, but went exactly the wrong way with it. It was
perhaps true, Bickel conceded to John Marshall, that to leave the
question of constitutionality to the legislature would, absurdly, "allow
those whose power is supposed to be limited themselves to set the
limits." But the same could be said of the courts: "[T]he Constitution
does not limit the power of the legislature alone. It limits that of the
courts as well, and it may be equally absurd, therefore, to allow courts
to set the limits. "40
For Bickel, this was a weakness in John Marshall's argument, for
surely Marshall could not have intended to rest the power of judicial
review, and against legislative supremacy, on premises that equally
35. Id. at 178.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
ATTHE BAR OF POLITICS 3-4 (2d ed. 1988).
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could be deployed against the supremacy of the judiciary's constitu
tional determinations! But Bickel, like so many who have followed
him, erred in assuming that the point of Marbury was to establish judi
cial supremacy rather than to demolish legislative supremacy and
establish coequal and independent judicial interpretive competence.
The problem with Bickel's critique of Marbury was that he assumed
that Marshall was trying to prove the modern Myth of Marbury, when
Marshall was doing nothing of the kind. Bickel could not and did not
point to any flaw in Marshall's reasoning - in fact, Bickel's analysis
agrees with my own about where Marshall's reasoning leads. But
Marbury's reasoning in that case does not yield the conclusion that
Bickel thought it ought to, or needed to, in order to .justify modern
practice. That is precisely my point: Marbury's reasoning and modern
constitutional practice are hopelessly irreconcilable with each other.
Marbury's logic stands opposed to any claim of judicial supremacy the idea that the other branches are bound by the courts' actions no
matter what. Bickel's analysis supports, quite unintentionally, my posi
tion here.41
The attentive defender of judicial supremacy might at this point
interject that the premise of this extension of Marbury's reasoning is
that the Court is as likely to err as the political branches. Not at all.
The premise is that the Court could err and that there is no more
reason in principle - and none remotely suggested in the pages of
Marbury - for Branch X to be bound by Branch Y's errors than for
Branch Z to be bound by Branch X's. Marshall's whole argument for
the coordinate interpretive competence and independence of the judi
ciary assumes the existence of an unconstitutional action by another
branch. In such an instance, it is "an absurdity too gross to be insisted
on" to require a coordinate branch to be bound, within the province of
its duties, to enforce or acquiesce in such an act, contrary to the para
mount law of the nation. Nowhere does Marshall say that "unconstitu
tional" is defined by whatever a court, and a court alone, says. Rather,
he treats "unconstitutional" as an objective fact - whether something
is unconstitutional is determined, interestingly enough, by what the
Constitution says.42

It is at this point that Marshall turns, finally, to specific constitu
tional provisions, which he uses not as proof-texts of judicial suprem
acy but as examples of the absurdity of requiring that courts be bound,
within the sphere of their power and in the performance of their
duties, by a plain violation of the Constitution perpetrated by another
branch. In each case, the argument can be turned around and applied
41. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11, at 245.
42. I will have more to say about this below. See infra Section III.E (arguing that one of
the implications of Marbury is that the proper controlling methodology of constitutional
interpretation is textualism.)
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to interpretation of the Constitution by the executive and legislative
branches.
The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising
under the constitution.
Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that, in
using it, the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising
under the constitution should be decided without examining the instru
ment under which it arises?
This is too extravagant to be maintained.
In some cases then, the constitution must be looked into by the
judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to
read, or to obey?43

Flawlessly logical. But the same logic applies, for example, to the
President: the executive power of Article II extends to all matters of
enforcement or execution of U.S. law. Moreover, the President is spe
cifically charged to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"
presumably including the Constitution as the paramount law of the
Nation, and further obliged to swear an oath to "preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States."44 Could it be the inten
tion of those who gave this power, and imposed a duty of faithfulness
to the Constitution, to say that in carrying it out the Constitution
should not be looked into? That a situation arising under the
Constitution should be decided without examining the instrument
itself? This, like a similar disability on the courts, "is too extravagant
to be maintained." In some cases, the Constitution must be looked
into by the President. If he can open it at all, what part is he forbidden
to read?
The point is particularly easy to make with respect to the
President, because the constitutional provisions giving him power and
responsibility to "take Care" to faithfully execute the laws and to
"preserve, protect, and defend" the Constitution are remarkably clear
in assigning duties that require interpretation of the Constitution.
Indeed, I have had some students advance the view, which I allude to
above, that the Constitution in express terms makes the President, not
the courts, the special "Guardian of the Constitution"! One need not
go so far in order to make the simpler point that Article Ill's
assignment of "the judicial Power" to decide cases "arising under the
Constitution" does not, in a regime of separation of powers, create a
superior power of constitutional interpretation than does Article II's

43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178-79.
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("(H)e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe
cuted . . . . "); U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8 (prescribing presidential oath to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States").
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assignment of a duty to "preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution of the United States."
The same point can be made (albeit more awkwardly) with respect
to Congress, and indeed with respect to all who exercise power under
the Constitution. Every act of Congress is an implicit act of constitu
tional interpretation concerning the scope of its Article I (or other
legislative) powers. Under the logic of Marbury, if Congress is obliged
to consider the question of the constitutional propriety of its actions,
could it be the intention of those who imposed such an obligation to
say that, in making the determination, the Constitution itself should
not be looked into?
Marshall then proceeds with hypothetical examples of constitu
tional questions that easily could come up in a case appropriate for
judicial resolution.
There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illus
trate this subject.
It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of
flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered
in such a case? ought the judges to close their eye.s on the constitution,
and only see the law?
The constitution declares that "no bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed."
If, however, such a bill should be passed and a person should be
prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those victims
whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?
"No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason un
less on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
confession in open court."
Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the
courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be de
parted from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one
witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the
constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?
From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is ap
parent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instru
ment, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legisla
ture.45

Once again, Marshall's logic is impeccable. And once again, it is
easy to turn these hypotheticals into situations calling for executive or
congressional interpretation of the Constitution, and pose the same
rhetorical questions: Should Congress "close its eyes" to the
45. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179-80.
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Constitution before passing a law that is arguably a bill of attainder or
an ex post facto law, or imposing an export duty on articles from a
particular state, deferring such constitutional questions to (possible)
subsequent judicial determination? If the courts' precedents would
uphold such a law in instances where Congress reads the Constitution
to forbid such action, should Congress close its eyes? Or is it at least
competent to judge for itself, within its province?46 What if Congress
passed, and the courts upheld, an unconstitutional tax or duty, or a bill
of attainder or ex post facto law, or convicted a man of treason on the
strength of the testimony of one witness rather than two? Would the
President be bound to execute the law, shutting his eyes to the
Constitution? If Congress should pass such a law, and a prior admini
stration brought a prosecution pursuant to it, and a court wrongly
"condemn[ed) to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors
to preserve," must the President go along?
There are, of course, some difficult questions posed by a theory
that permits multiple actors independently to interpret the
Constitution, particularly the question of which interpretation will or
should prevail.47 But my point here is simply that none of the
hypotheticals posed by Marshall remotely suggests judicial exclusivity
or even judicial priority in constitutional interpretation. They all
involve constitutional questions of a type that could (and should) be
considered in the ordinary course of business of the legislative and
executive branches. There is nothing uniquely judicial about them, so
as to suggest in any way that constitutional interpretation is a uniquely
judicial activity. Marshall's point - the crux of his argument for an in
dependent power of judicial review - is that constitutional supremacy
implies independent interpretive power because, once it is assumed
that a coordinate branch might depart from the Constitution, it
becomes absurd to say that one of the other coordinate branches is
bound to ratify the error and is foreclosed from looking directly to the
words and logic of the document itself.
Marshall's third major argument in support of judicial review flows
from the judges' oath to support the Constitution. Up to this point,
Marshall's opinion has had the feel of a straightforward, deductive
mathematical proof. It is only when he gets to the oath that the opin-

46. More problematically, if the courts' precedents would strike down such a law in
instances where Congress reads the Constitution to permit such action, is Congress bound to
see only the judicial decision, and not the Constitution? Congress may have the prerogative
of independent constitutional interpretation in such a case, but it has no power to require the
j udiciary to agree and abandon its independent interpretive power. This leaves open the
question of whether it is legitimate for Congress, in pressing a position that probably will
prove futile, to impose the costs of proving such futility on individual litigants. But that in
the end is a question more of prudence and policy than of constitutional power.
47. For a discussion of how a decentralized model of constitutional interpretive power
might work, see Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 , at 321-42.
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ion becomes genuinely impassioned.48 Immediately after stating that
the Constitution is "a rule for the government of courts, as well as of
the legislature," Marshall asks:
Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to support it?
This oath certainly applies, in an especial manner, to their conduct in
their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were
to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating
what they swear to support!
* * *

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the
constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his
government? if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery.
To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime.49

A crime! Marshall takes the oath requirement very seriously;
indeed, the founding generation as a whole took oath-taking
extremely seriously.so Article VI of the Constitution requires that all
legislative, executive, and judicial officers, both of the United States
government and of the governments of the states, "be bound by Oath
or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . ."s1 And, as we have
already observed, Article II of the Constitution prescribes a special
oath for the President, under which he is required to swear or affirm
that he will, to the best of his ability, "preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States."s2
The implication of Marshall's argument from the oath requirement
is obvious: Marbury is no argument for judicial supremacy in constitu
tional interpretation. It is an argument for the personal constitutional
responsibility of all who swear an oath to support the Constitution to
resist and refuse support to usurpations or violations of that
Constitution by all others. To paraphrase Marbury once again, why
does the Constitution require that members of Congress, the
President, other federal judges, state judges, state legislatures, and
state executives, all swear an oath to discharge their duties agreeably
to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no
48. See id. at 257-58.
49. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 1 80.
50. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 457, 1 486-90 ( 1997) (discussing centrality and seriousness of oath requirements for
sworn testimony to understanding the original meaning, in social context, of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch,
supra note 1 1 , at 257 & n.150 (discussing oath requirements and their importance in the
founding generation).
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
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rule for their government? If it is closed to them, and cannot be
inspected by them? "If such be the real state of things, this is worse
than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes
equally a crime."53
Again, Alexander Bickel is an unwitting ally in my cause. Here is
his critique of Marshall's argument on this point:
Far from supporting Marshall, the oath is perhaps the strongest textual
argument against him. For it would seem to obligate each of these officers,
in the performance of his own function, to support the Constitution. . .
Surely the language lends itself more readily to this interpretation than
to Marshall's apparent conclusion, that everyone's oath to support the.
Constitution is qualified by the judiciary's oath to do the same, and that
every official of government is sworn to support the Constitution as the
j udges, in the pursuance of the same oath, have construed it, rather than
as his own conscience may dictate.54
.

Hold the phone a minute: What makes this latter alternative
"Marshall's apparent conclusion"? Is this anything other than the
modern Myth of Marbury, read back into the case from a distance of
a century and a half? Bickel was right, that the oath would seem to
obligate each of these officers, in the performance of his own function,
to support - and thus independently interpret, according to Marbury
- the Constitution. But Bickel was wrong in thinking that this
furnishes any sort of argument against Marshall's conclusion, for the
simple reason that Bickel was wrong about what Marshall's conclusion
was.

The Oath Clause is an important argument in Marbury. It is
Marshall's icing on the cake of his proof of judicial review, a moral
clincher that is Marshall's distinctive addition to the well-accepted
argument for judicial review. And it is one, as we shall see in a mo
ment, that has important implications in its own right, for it is the only
purely textual (as opposed to structural or inferential) argument in
Marbury that supports independent interpretive power by agencies of
state government.
The final substantive paragraph of Marbury ends the opinion with
what is, comparatively, a whimper. "It is also not entirely unworthy of
observation," Marshall writes, half-heartedly, that the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI lists the Constitution first, in its listing of what
constitutes the "supreme law of the Land" and gives a similar status to
statutes "made in pursuance of the constitution." This is only weak
supportive evidence of a power of judicial review, because the
53. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 . I develop the Oath Clause argument at greater
length in other work, drawing as well on President Andrew Jackson's reliance on the oath in
support of his veto, on constitutional grounds that had been rejected by the Supreme Court,
of the bill rechartering the Bank of the United States. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch,
supra note 1 1 , at 257-62.
54. BICKEL, supra note 40, at 8 (emphasis added).
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Supremacy Clause proceeds to say that the judges "in every state"
shall be bound by that supreme law. Still, Marshall notes, the
Supremacy Clause "confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed
to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument. "55
Once again, the concluding paragraph is hard to square with the
judicial supremacist Myth of Marbury. If "courts, as well as other
departments" are "bound by that instrument," it would seem to follow
that the other departments are bound to hold the courts, as well as
each other, to "that instrument" and to serve as independent interpre
tive checks against deviations from the Constitution's commands.
Ill. MARBURY'S IMPLICATIONS
If Marbury's logic is right, then nearly all of our contemporary
constitutional practice is wrong. The myth of judicial supremacy that
stands at the center of constitutional law today - the notion that the
Supreme Court's decisions are final and binding on all other actors in
our constitutional system, no matter what, so that all that really
matters in constitutional law is the Supreme Court's decisions and
precedents - is utterly groundless as a matter of first principles of the
Constitution. The myth finds no support in the text, structure, or
history of the Constitution.56 Instead, it rests on a complete misreading
of the case that is supposed to be the source and justification for the
myth: Marbury.
What if we were to take Marbury's logic seriously on its own terms,
and apply faithfully its core propositions: constitutional supremacy,
interpretive independence, and the personal responsibility conferred
by the oath to support the Constitution? In this Section, I will sketch,
in broad strokes, four seemingly radical but entirely logical implica- ,
tions of Marbury, and a fifth implication that is not at all radical but
also presents an indictment of present constitutional practice. My first ,
four propositions are:
(1) the existence of a power of "executive review" parallel to the power
of judicial review;
(2) the existence of a coequal power of congressional constitutional in
terpretation;
(3) the unconstitutionality of the doctrine of stare decisis in constitu
tional law; and
55. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 1 80.
56. I have developed this specific proposition and supporting evidence at length in other
writing, and will not repeat those points here. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 , at 228-62, 292-321; Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at 1349-58.
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( 4) the existence of a legitimate power of state government officials to
engage in independent federal constitutional interpretation, in
matters within their province.
My fifth proposition, somewhat less controversial than the others,
is that Marbury's conception of written constitutionalism implies
a particular methodology of constitutional interpretation: originalist
textualism - that is, the binding authority of the written constitutional
text, considered as a whole and taken in context, as its words and
phrases would have been understood by reasonably well-informed
speakers or readers of the English language at the time.
A.

"Executive Review"

It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the executive
department to say what the law is. Those who apply the law to par
ticular instances - and execution of the law is a quintessential
example of applying the law to particular cases - must of necessity
expound and interpret the law in the course of performing such
duties.57 The President applies the law. The Constitution is a rule for
the governance of the President (and his subordinates58), as well as for
the courts and for Congress. Indeed, as noted, that instrument
commands the President to "take Care that the laws be faithfully
executed."59 The laws of the nation include its Constitution, which is
listed first in Article VI's description of the "supreme law of the
Land." As Marbury correctly holds, the Constitution is the "para
mount law of the nation," and is thus of superior obligation to other
sources of law, like statutes and even judgments of the courts. The
President is specifically assigned the sworn duty to "preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States." It follows that, in
carrying out his executive duties as President, the President must give
effect to the Constitution in preference to a statute, or judicial decree,
in cases where they conflict. Again, to borrow Marbury's words, "[t]his
is of the very essence of [presidential] duty."60 If a statute, or a judicial

57. Cf Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177 (using parallel language with respect to the
judicial department).
58. The structure of Article II, which vests the executive power solely in "a President,"
binds all other executive branch officers to the President's constitutional interpretation when
exercising executive power on the President's behalf. See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Protestantism and Comparative Competence: A Reply to Professors Levinson and Eisgruber,
83 GEO. L.J. 385, 387-88 (1994) (stating that "[t]he situation of subordinate executive offi
cials raises a special problem" in that " [t]he President is the executive branch" and subordi
nates have no constitutional right or authority to substitute their views for his, but nonethe
less have a moral obligation not to act in violation of their sworn oaths to support the
Constitution - a moral obligation that might require resignation in some circumstances).
59. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3, cl. 4.
60. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178. ("This is of the very essence of judicial duty.").
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ruling, be in opposition to the Constitution, such that the President
must either take action conformably with the Constitution or con
formably with the act of Congress or decision of the judiciary, he must
choose - and he must choose the Constitution.
If, therefore, the President is to regard the Constitution, and to
regard it as superior to any ordinary act of a subordinate institution
created under it, must he close his eyes on the Constitution and see
only the act of Congress or the decision of the courts? Why does he .
swear an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution if it is
closed to him? The oath certainly applies in a special manner to the
President's conduct in his official character. How immoral to impose it
on him, if he must be used as the instrument, and the knowing instru
ment, for violating what he has sworn to preserve, protect, and
defend! To require the President to swear such an oath, yet require
him, when persuaded that another branch has acted inconsistently
with the Constitution, nonetheless to enforce its statute or its judicial
judgment, makes a solemn mockery of the oath.
The argument for "executive review" - the power and duty of the
President to exercise independent legal judgment and review of the
validity of the actions of both other coordinate branches - is thus
almost exactly parallel to the argument for judicial review set forth in
Marbury. The President is bound by the Constitution. He is not bound
by acts of other branches where those acts are contrary to the
Constitution, and he is not bound by those branches' views concerning
the constitutional propriety of their own acts, if indeed those views are
wrong by the lights of the Constitution itself. Rather, the President
possesses an independent power of constitutional review of the actions
of the other branches in any matter that falls within the sphere of his
governing powers as President under Article II of the Constitution.
This means that, just as the Supreme Court may, indeed must, refuse
to apply an unconstitutional statute of Congress, so too the President
may, indeed must, refuse to carry into execution an unconstitutional
statute of Congress. That is precisely the same situation as Marbury:
constitutional legal review of an act of Congress. But executive review,
by the same logic, also means that the President may, indeed must,
refuse to execute or carry out a decision of the judiciary that exceeds
the limits the Constitution has imposed on that branch. This is consti
tutional legal review of the decisions of courts. Such a view stands in
opposition to the operative premises of our constitutional system
today. Almost no constitutional scholar today embraces such a view,
but it follows inexorably from the logic of Marbury.6 1 Certain provi61. I have set forth this argument, derived in part from Marbury and in part from other
originalist sources, at length (with important qualifications and refinements) in earlier
writing. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 . A few have followed the
logic of this argument ninety percent of the way or better, see, e.g. , Steven G. Calabresi,
Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1421 (1999); Gary
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sions of the Constitution might be read as imposing specific restric
tions on the President's power to act on his independent interpretation
of the Constitution;62 the power might be restrained by principles of
interpretive restraint and method;63 and the power is of course subject
to the check of the other branches' exercise of their independent inter
pretive powers. But in principle, the President's power of constitu
tional interpretation is closely parallel to the courts'. Thus, the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution, federal statutes,
and treaties no more bind the President than the President's or Con
gress's interpretations bind the Court. All of this, I submit, follows
from Marbury, if one reads Marbury for what it says rather than for
what it has been misappropriated to mean.
B.

"Congressional Revie w "

If the presidency's awesome and wide-ranging constitutional
powers and strategic position, combined with independent interpretive
authority, make it "The Most Dangerous Branch,"64 it is not an
unchecked branch. Not only the courts, but also Congress, have a
power and province of constitutional interpretation. Congress inter
prets the Constitution, implicitly or explicitly, all the time, in the
course of performing its legislative duties. Indeed, it is no exaggeration
to say that Congress interprets the Constitution every time it enacts a
law, implicitly asserting that its enactment is within the scope of its
constitutional powers. Congress may employ its legislative powers
(and additional powers not strictly "legislative" in character) to check
the errant or willful interpretations of the President or of the courts,
and to advance its own views of the proper interpretation of constitu
tional provisions.

Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996), but I believe that no other scholar follows the logic of Marbury
in this regard all the way to its logical conclusion. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at
1355-57, n.66 (responding to these ninety-percenters); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993) (arguing that there ultimately is no middle ground between the
competing premises of judicial supremacy and the coordinacy of the several branches of the
federal government).
62. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11, at 288 ("There are, of course,
certain provisions of the Constitution the best reading of which specifically restricts the
power of the executive branch to enforce its understanding of the law against individuals
without the assent of some judicial actor."); id. at 288-92 (discussing the binding interpretive
power of grand and petit juries in criminal cases, and the limited "gatekeeper" role of the
judiciary in preserving this "trump-everybody" interpretive province of the jury).
63. Id. at 331-43 (discussing principles of "deference," "accommodation," and "execu
tive restraint").
64. This is the title of my earlier article on executive branch constitutional interpretive
power. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 11.
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Marbury, of course, is all about independent judicial review of acts
of Congress. But the premises and logic of Marbury - constitutional
supremacy, interpretive coordinacy, and the responsibility of all who
swear to support the Constitution to be guided by the document itself
and not by the misinterpretations of the other branches - fully sup
port a province and duty of Congress independently to interpret the
Constitution. The Constitution governs Congress, along with the other
branches, and the Constitution's requirements are paramount, taking
precedence over both presidential actions and judicial decrees that
exceed the limits of those branches' constitutional powers. Must
Congress nonetheless acquiesce in the actions or views of the Article
II or Article III branches, where such actions depart from the lan
guage of the document? If presidential or judicial action repugnant to
the constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind
Congress and oblige it to give effect to this action (assuming Congress
possessed an effectual power with which to resist, or defeat, such
unconstitutional executive or judicial action)? That would be, in
Marbury's words, to overthrow in fact what was established in theory.
And it would also require senators and representatives to violate their
oaths: Article VI mandates that all members of Congress swear an
oath to support the Constitution. Such oath, by Marbury's lights,
would be a solemn mockery - and to swear it would be "a crime" if Congress were forbidden to read the Constitution itself and inquire
directly into the constitutional validity of acts of the other branches,
but instead relegated to a role of docile servility to the constitutional
determinations of one or both of the other branches.
Marbury's logic thus yields the same conclusion for Congress as it
does for the President: Congress is not bound by the constitutional
views of either the President or the Supreme Court in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, and may press its views with all the constitutional
powers at its disposal.

And Congress has quite a number of such powers, some with po
tentially sweeping consequence. Congress (the Senate alone, actually) '
possesses a substantial role in checking appointments of both '
executive and judicial officers, and it properly may exercise its power
in this area based on its vision of how the Constitution should be
interpreted and applied by the executive branch and by the courts.65
Congress possesses substantial control over the jurisdiction and reme
dial authority of the federal courts, including the Supreme Court, and
may employ that power to rein in an imperial judiciary.66 Congress
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause). See generally Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562-78 (1995) (re
viewing Stephen L. Carter, The Confirmation Mess: Cleaning Up the Federal Appointments
Process (1994) and making the argument for this proposition in detail).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (power to "constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme
Court"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (power to make laws "necessary and proper for
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possesses broad discretion to enact laws "necessary and proper" for
carrying into execution the powers of the judicial department. This
discretion includes the power to prescribe rules of decision, procedure,
and evidence that can substantially constrain judicial decisionmaking
and, quite possibly, require the courts to hew to Congress's vision of
the Constitution's text, structure, and intent.67 As the ultimate trump
card, Congress also possesses the power to impeach (the House of
Representatives) and remove (the Senate) executive or judicial offi
cers for "high crimes and misdemeanors," a term that does not have a
fixed, determinate meaning and, I submit, legitimately can extend to
violations by an executive or judicial officer of his or her constitutional
oath and constitutional responsibilities, as determined by the ultimate
independent judgment of the House and the Senate.68 Thus, Congress
may impeach and remove a President whom Congress sincerely
believes has acted in deliberate violation of the Constitution or of his
constitutional duties, as interpreted (presumably in good faith) by
Congress. Likewise, Congress may impeach and remove federal
judges, including justices of the Supreme Court, who in the ultimate
judgment of Congress, act in deliberate violation or disregard of the
Constitution or otherwise willfully ignore, manipulate, or disregard
controlling law.
That last proposition, of course, is utter blasphemy in the constitu
tional world dominated by the Myth of Marbury. In a regime of judi
cial interpretive supremacy, impeachment of justices on the ground
that their decisions deliberately and flagrantly violate the Constitution
(and thus violate their oaths) makes no sense. The justices' decisions
are the Constitution. Impeachment on such a ground reflects a basic
confusion on the part of Congress.69
carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"); U.S. CONST. art. I II, § 1
(reference to "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab
lish"); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (allocation of jurisdiction among federal courts subject
to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."). On the
power of Congress over matters of judicial practice, procedure, and remedies, see Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21-22 (1825) ("That a power to make laws for carrying
into execution all the judgments which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is
expressly conferred by [the Necessary and Proper Clause], seems to be one of those plain
propositions which reasoning cannot render plainer. The terms of the clause neither require
nor admit of elucidation.").
67. See generally Wayman, 23 U.S. at 21-22. For a defense of congressional power to
prescribe rules of judicial decision, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J.
1535, 1567-99 (2000) [hereinafter Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute] (collecting
cases and examples); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lawson 's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18
CONST. COMM. 231 (2001) (responding to objections to this view).
68. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Impeachment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1340 (L.W. Levy et al. eds., 2000).
69. A judicial supremacist Supreme Court (that is to say, the Supreme Court of the past
fifty years or so) would quite possibly be prepared to intervene to hold such an impeachment
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But if the correct understanding of Marbury, and of the
Constitution, is that no branch has interpretive supremacy; that each
branch has independent interpretive power within its own sphere; and
that the standard governing each, and to which each is required to ad
here, is the Constitution itself, then impeachment of judges on the
ground of constitutional infidelity is not confused at all: it is the ulti
mate, and perhaps the only truly effective, means by which Congress
might, with the cooperation of the executive, resist and check a series
of attempted usurpations of power by the courts.70 There may be
important prudential reasons for restraint in the exercise of such a
heavy-handed power; some might seriously debate whether impeach
ment on such grounds properly falls within the scope of the power to
impeach for "high crimes and misdemeanors"; but there is no reason
in principle why Congress is barred from independent consideration of
these prudential and constitutional questions by reason of a claim that
the judiciary's decisions are immune from constitutional scrutiny by
the other branches.71
proceeding unconstitutional, notwithstanding its prior holding that impeachment issues are
nonjusticiable "political questions," see Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)), on the '
ground that it interferes with independent judicial power and the Court's (asserted) final
authority "to say what the law is."
70. The propriety of impeachment of judicial officers for serious, willful disregard of the
Constitution or other controlling law is strongly hinted at in two of Alexander Hamilton's
papers of The Federalist describing the judiciary. The Federalist No. 81 contains the most ex
tensive discussion, ending a passage on the lack of danger from judicial usurpations with the
punchline that the impeachment power would serve as a check against such a possibility:

It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments
on the legislative authority, which has been upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a
phantom. Particular misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature may
now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to amount to an inconvenience,
or in any sensible degree to affect the order of the political system. This may be inferred with
certainty from the general nature of the judicial power, from the objects to which it relates,
from the manner in which it is exercised, from its comparative weakness, and from its total
incapacity to support its usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the
consideration of the important constitutional check which the power of instituting
impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and of determining upon them in the
other, would give to that body upon the members of the judicial department. This is alone a
complete security. There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usur
pations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body
intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption
by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to remove all apprehensions on the
subject it affords at the same time a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a court for
the trial of impeachments.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton), at 453; see also id. , NO. 79,
at 444 ("The precautions for [the judges'] responsibility are comprised in the article re
specting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of
Representatives and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office and
disqualified from holding any other. This is the only provision on the point which is consis
tent with the necessary independence of the j udicial character . . . .") .
71. I hope to develop this theory in future work. For now, I will only respond to one ob
vious objection: that impeachment for faithless constitutional decisions violates the idea of
judicial independence. "Judicial independence," however, is not a freestanding constitu
tional command; it is, rather, a consequence of a tenure of "good behavior" and salary guar-
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In addition to these strong, but blunt, front-end and back-end
checks on interpretive abuse by the other branches, Congress's prov
inces of constitutional interpretation also include the power to pro
pose constitutional amendments; the coequal power to interpret
extremely important constitutional provisions, like the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, that Congress explicitly has
been given the power to "enforce" through legislation;72 and, indeed,
the legislative power generally, including the vitally important appro
priations power. As noted, every legislative enactment by Congress is,
in a sense, an act of constitutional interpretation - an implicit asser
tion by Congress that it has constitutional power to do what it is doing.
And, whenever such an assertion runs up against the contrary views of
the President or the courts, Congress legitimately may press its inde
pendent constitutional views with all the legislative powers at its dis
posal. It may not bind the other branches with its views, of course: that
is the absolutely foundational principle of Marbury. But it follows by
the same reasoning that the other branches may not bind Congress
either. Congress has as much right to interpret the Constitution as
does the Supreme Court, and arguably possesses greater powers with
which to press its views.
C.

The Unconstitutionality of Stare Decisis

If Marbury is right, the judicial doctrine of stare decisis - the prac
tice of generally adhering to precedent "whether or not mistaken" is wrong.73 Stare decisis is, of course, not required by the Constitution,

antees. "Good behavior" is properly understood as a description of tenure in office, not itself
an impeachment standard, but that merely returns one to the question of whether deliberate
disregard of the Constitution, in violation of one's oath, could be considered a "high crime
or misdemeanor" (the standard that Article I I imposes on all "Officers of the United
States," a term that includes judges, see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4) and the further question
whether Congress has independent constitutional power to construe and apply this provi
sion, or must accede to judicial interpretations of it.
72. The Supreme Court has recently said that Congress does not have coequal power to
interpret and apply the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, but is limited to
enforcing judicial understandings of those amendments. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997). But that judicial view of the scope of Congress's power is, by the logic of the
argument from Marbury sketched in the text, neither sound as a matter of principle nor
binding on Congress when Congress is acting within its sphere. For persuasive arguments
that City of Boerne is wrong in its specific interpretation of the scope of Congress's legisla
tive power to enforce the provisions of the post-Civil War Amendments, see Michael W.
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 153 (1997); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE
L.J. 1 15 (1999).
73. The "whether or not mistaken" formulation comes from Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992), the Supreme Court's most ambitious exposition of the doc
trine of stare decisis. I have explained elsewhere why this is the core of the doctrine. Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute, supra note 67, at 1 538 n.8. In short, the idea of adhering
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as even the Supreme Court concedes.74 But even more fundamentally,
when used in this strong sense of adhering to precedents even if
wrong, stare decisis is unconstitutional. (In any other sense, stare deci
sis is simply irrelevant, or deceptive: a court that invokes the doctrine
to justify a decision it was prepared to reach on other grounds is
adding a makeweight, or using the doctrine as a cover for its judgment
on the merits.)
Consider again what Marbury says: The Constitution is supreme,
paramount law, superior in obligation to other law. The judges are
bound by the Constitution; the instrument is a rule for the government
of courts. Imagine if you will - it isn't hard to do - a judicial decision
that is not consistent with the Constitution; that ignores its provisions,
or construes them wrongly; or where the Court has plainly exceeded
the limits marked out by the Constitution's allocation of powers:
Marbury says, with respect to legislative actions of such description,
that "[t]he constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchange
able by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it."75 The same holds true of judicial actions that depart from the
Constitution: The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is alterable when the judiciary
shall please to alter it. A doctrine of stare decisis that holds that a
faithless j udicial interpretation of the Constitution at time Tl is
binding at time T2 is a doctrine of judicial alteration of the paramount
law. If the Constitution is not alterable whenever the judiciary shall
please to alter it, then "a [judicial precedent] contrary to the constitu
tion is not law;" and if the alternative is true, that the Constitution is
alterable at the judiciary's option, "then written constitutions are
absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own
nature illimitable. "76
The idea of precedent is almost sacrosanct to lawyers, conditioned
by the common law and the case method, so much so that few have
examined carefully its premises and whether those premises are com
patible with a system that purports to accord primacy to a written, en
acted text. But on what principle may one generation of judges pur
port to transform its power to decide cases into a prospective power to
bind future judges in future cases? On what principle may a judge in a
to precedent, as an independent duty, has bite only if a court would decide the case differ
ently absent such a supposed duty. Id. at 1538 n.8.
74. As to the nonconstitutional status of the doctrine, see Paulsen, Abrogating Stare De
cisis by Statute, supra note 67, at 1537 n.1 (collecting cases acknowledging that the doctrine is
one of judicial policy and not constitutional requirement); id. at 1543-51 (discussing and
analyzing same).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
76. Id.
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later case abandon his or her sworn duty to uphold the Constitution by
deliberately following a precedent that the judge believes is inconsis
tent with that Constitution? Under the reasoning of Marbury, the
Constitution must always be given preference over the faithless acts of
mere government agents that depart from it. The Constitution is
paramount law and must take precedence (so to speak) over prece
dents that depart from it.77
It follows, I submit, that no court should ever deliberately adhere
to what it is fully persuaded are the erroneous constitutional decisions
of the past. To do so is to act in deliberate violation of the
Constitution. The judicial doctrine of stare decisis - the idea that
courts should (as they sometimes say they do, and as they sometimes
in fact do) adhere to the principles of prior cases even when persuaded
that those principles are wrong as a matter of the correct interpreta
tion of the Constitution or other controlling federal law - is funda
mentally inconsistent with the Constitution and with the logic of
Marbury itself. The doctrine should be repudiated entirely in the area
of constitutional law.78
And that goes for lower courts, too. Why should lower court
judges be bound by higher court precedent, including Supreme Court
precedent, where they are fully persuaded that the precedent is not
consistent with the Constitution itself? Marbury says the Constitution
is supreme; that departures from it cannot be regarded as binding; that
the Constitution supplies a rule for the government of courts; and that
the oath requires that its takers be guided by their best understanding
of the Constitution and not pliantly accede to deviations perpetrated
by others. All of these points apply to lower court judges - state and
federal - who are called upon to decide cases arising under the
Constitution and swear Article VI's mandated oath to support it.
Unless some other constitutional provision trumps or ousts Marbury's
77. The argument in this paragraph owes much to a short article by Professor Gary
Lawson several years ago. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 27-28 (1994) ("If the Constitution says X and a prior j udicial
decision says Y, a court has not merely the power, but the obligation, to prefer the
Constitution."); see also Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 408 (1988) (arguing that "judges are
oath-bound to rule in accordance with the Constitution, not with prior opinions interpreting
the Constitution"); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of
Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59
ALB. L. REV. 671, 680 (1995) [hereinafter Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise
of Constitutional Interpretation] ("{S]tare decisis is not just another bad idea. It is, I think,
unconstitutional.").
78. Of course, I invoke Marbury as persuasive authority only; by its own reasoning, it
would not be controlling if it were wrong on the point in question. And it is wrong on many
other points. See Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness, supra note 17. But for those who worship at
the altar of precedent, it is at the very least rather ironic that Marbury v. Madison, widely
regarded as the foundational case of all constitutional law - a worthy precedent if ever
there were one - logically dictates that precedent can never be regarded as controlling
where it departs from a proper understanding of the Constitution.
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reasoning as applied in this context - the words "supreme" and "infe
rior" in Article III are plausible candidates, but do not necessarily im
ply anything more than a hierarchy in which a higher court may review
and reverse the judgment of a lower court, and do not transform such
lower court judges into mere law clerks or potted plants79 Marbury's logic applies for lower courts as well as others. Thus, a
lower court may, and arguably must, "underrule" (to coin a term)80
Supreme Court precedents that depart from a sound reading of the
written Constitution. The Supreme Court usually will have the
authority and jurisdiction to review and reverse such lower court un
derrulings; such j urisdiction is consistent with Article III and the con
stitutional structure generally.81 But that does not mean that the lower
court judges are personally required to abet the constitutional viola
tion. They can, and should, make the Supreme Court do its own dirty
work. They can, and must, exercise their own (reverse-able) constitu
tional interpretive power independently, and correctly.
D.

State Interposition and Nullification

The terms "interposition" and "nullification" are practically consti
tutional profanities these days. The terms are associated with seces
sionists of the mid-nineteenth century and segregationists of the
mid-twentieth, both of whom employed somewhat warped notions of
state interpretive authority in the service of the most unjust of causes.
But the correctness of a constitutional theory cannot be judged by its
misappropriation and misapplication by constitutional hijackers, in
cluding South Carolina's John Calhoun, the name most prominently
associated with the theory.82

79. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of
Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 77-88 (1989) (hereinafter Paulsen,
Accusing Justice] (arguing that the word "supreme" only requires that the Supreme Court be
a court of final jurisdiction in the sense that no appeal lies to another court; that the word
"inferior" does not mean subordinate in the sense of being an agent of a principal; and that
Article III provides for the structural equivalence of all federal judges). The phrase "potted
plants" comes from Sanford Levinson, On Positivism & Potted Plants: "Inferior" Judges and
the Task of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843 ( 1993 ) (making a similar
suggestion).
80. Paulsen, Accusing Justice, supra note 79, at 82 (defending power of lower court
judges to "underrule" Roe v. Wade, if fully persuaded of its incorrectness as a matter of
constitutional interpretation).
81. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 ( 1821 ); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. ( 1 Wheat.) 304 ( 1816) .
82. For an excellent historical treatment of nullification, see WILLIAM W. FREEHLING,
PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
1816-1836 ( 1965 ). For a lucid untangling of the assorted (and sordid) constitutional theories
propounded at various times on this subject, see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S
CONSTITUTION 26-91 (2003 ).
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The doctrines of interposition and nullification have reasonably
respectable roots. The idea of independent state authority to interpret
the Constitution - and to resist asserted violations of the Constitution
by the instrumentalities of the national government - dates back at
least a half-decade before Marbury, to the Virginia and Kentucky
Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and James Madison's "Report of 1800"
for the Commonwealth of Virginia.83 Indeed, they can claim support
earlier yet, in the political theory of federalism and state checks on
national power set forth in The Federalist.84
Interestingly, the idea of state government authority to interpret
the federal Constitution finds much to commend it in the reasoning of
Marbury: the Constitution is supreme, not the actions of subordinate
agencies under it; departures from the Constitution thus cannot be
regarded as obligatory and binding lest we overthrow in fact what is
established in theory; and those who swear an oath to support the
Constitution must interpret it faithfully and independently and could
not have been intended to have been forced to violate their
consciences by accepting the unsound constitutional judgments of oth83. The Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, the Answers of several other states' legisla
tures, and Madison's Report are reprinted in 4 ELLIOTI'S DEBATES, at 528-80 (2d ed. 1891).
84. For strong indications of support for this position in The Federalist, see THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 28, No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), at 206-07 ("If the representatives
of the people betray their constituents, there is then no resource left but in the exertion of
that original right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of government,
and which against the usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely bet
ter prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state . . . . Power being
almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to
check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition to
wards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will
infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of
the other as the instrument of redress. . . . It may safely be received as an axiom in our politi
cal system, that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete
security against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority . . . . [P]ossessing all
the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular
plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the community."); id. No.
33, at 225 ("But it will not follow from this doctrine [i.e. , the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI] that acts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but
which are invasions of the residuary authorities of the smaller societies, will become the su
preme law of the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated
as such."); id. No. 44, at 290 (noting that the people, by the "election of more faithful repre
sentatives," may "annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may
be more confided in against the unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legisla
tures, for this plain reason, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the
rights of the latter"); id. No. 5 1 , at 321 ("In a single republic, all the power surrendered by
the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations
are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments.
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided
between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among
distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be con
trolled by itself."); id. No. 84, at 478 ("The executive and legislative bodies of each State will
be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every department of the national admini
stration. . . . ").
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ers. Again, all these points apply to state government officials who are
called on to consider federal constitutional issues within the sphere of
their state government functions, and who likewise swear an oath,
pursuant to Article VI, to support the Constitution. True, officers of
state governments are not coordinate departments of the national
government, as Congress, the President, and the judiciary are. But
everything else in Marbury applies, and Marbury makes as much of
the idea of constitutional supremacy, and of the obligation of the oath,
as it does the coordinacy of the branches of the federal government.
It follows, I submit, that state government officials, who likewise
swear an oath to support the U.S. Constitution as "supreme law of the
Land,'' are not bound to submit docilely to unconstitutional actions of
the agencies of the national government. By the logic of Marbury, they
cannot be bound by the erroneous constitutional views of organs of
the national government, but are empowered, even required, to inter
pret the Constitution directly. But note that, just as Marbury's proof of
independent judicial authority to interpret the Constitution does not
properly imply judicial interpretive supremacy, neither does the exis
tence of state interpretive competence imply state interpretive omnipo
tence. This, or some modified version of it, was Calhoun's mistake.
States are not bound by federal interpretations, but the federal gov
ernment is not bound by states' interpretations either.85
The right answer is that every government actor - state and
federal - is sworn to uphold the Constitution, and that none is the
master of the others in terms of what adherence to that oath requires.
85. The same holds for state secession. President Abraham Lincoln's argument against
secession is absolutely sound: the Constitution confers no unilateral, plenary right of a state
to secede. No state has a right to secede that the Nation as a whole must honor - a state's
interpretation does not, and cannot, bind the national government. See Lincoln, First
Inaugural Address, reprinted in 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES & WRITINGS, 1859-1865:
SPEECHES, LETIERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES &
PROCLAMATIONS 218 ("[N)o State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the
Union . . . . ") But Lincoln also thought it necessary to argue that no violation of the
Constitution had occurred that might be thought to justify secession, id. at 219 ("Is it true,
then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not."), ap
parently conceding the plausibility of the argument that a state might legitimately secede as
an extreme remedy for an extremely serious breach of the Constitution by the federal
government. Id. at 219 ("If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a mi
nority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify
revolution - certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case.").
The question of secession is distinguishable in important respects from the question of
interposition, but both potentially share the idea that state governments may, and arguably
must, interpret the U.S. Constitution, and may with propriety resist violations of the
Constitution by the federal government with whatever powers are available to state
governments to check such abuses. But the existence of such state interpretive power surely
does not bind the organs of federal government, which may properly resist state misinterpre
tations or abuses of the Constitution with all the power at their disposal, in order to correct
such state departures from the Constitution. See, e.g. , Grant v. Lee (Appomattox Court
House, Apr. 1 865). I develop the interposition and secession points at greater length in a
forthcoming essay. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpreta
tion, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
.
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Each branch of the federal government possesses coequal interpretive
authority with the others and may seek to make its interpretation of
the Constitution "stick," so to speak, with the constitutional powers at
its disposal.86 So too state government actors possess, by virtue of their
oaths to support the U.S. Constitution and the supremacy of the
written Constitution over all instrumentalities of the federal
government, the prerogative and duty faithfully and independently to
interpret the Constitution of the United States and to resist, with the
powers at their disposal, violations of that Constitution by the federal
government. Just as no branch of the federal government has interpre
tive supremacy, no level of government - federal or state - has
interpretive supremacy. The precise accommodation of conflicting
views is a function of the interaction among branches of government
and between levels of government.
Now, this should be a bit unsettling. This is Governor George
Wallace standing in the schoolhouse door.87 But it is also James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson leading Virginia and Kentucky in
resistance to the Sedition Act, and vindicating the Constitution in the
election of 1800. The fact that a constitutional theory or power might
be misused does not prove that it is wrong. Interposition, like the
Force, is a double-edged saber; it can be used for good or for evil,
depending on how and by whom it is being wielded. This is true of
interpretive power generally, including quite obviously interpretive
power as wielded by the Supreme Court.88 The true question is
whether the Constitution provides for a multiplicity of interpreters,
each independent of the others and armed with only a portion of the
constitutional power to make their interpretations stick, or instead
provides for a single authoritative interpreter whose decisions are con
clusive and binding on all other actors, even where they are wrong contrary to the written Constitution that is our paramount law - and
even where they are wicked.
86. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 28, NO. 49 (James Madison), at 313 ("The several de
partments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, neither of
them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries
between their respective powers.").
87. See Paulsen, Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional
Interpretation, supra note 78, at 688 (using the same example). In addition, there are impor
tant theoretical problems with treating a state's constitutional interpretations as possessing
parity with interpretations advanced by organs of the national government, some of which
may require important qualifications to any theory of state interpretive autonomy - re
finements I hope to develop in future work. For an enlightening brief treatment, see
FARBER, supra note 82, at 45-69. Cf Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 at
312-16.
88. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitlllional Deci
sion of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).
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Marbury's answer is that the latter proposition "would subvert the
very foundation of all written constitutions"89 and thus "reduce[] to
nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political
institutions."90 Marbury's logic endorses instead a multiplicity of voices
in constitutional interpretation, each independent of the others. To the
extent that the implications of this position depart greatly from
present constitutional practice - and they do - present practice
represents a betrayal of the principles of Marbury v. Madison.
* * * * *

Now, I know what you're thinking: If this is truly where Marbury
leads, following it would be anarchy! Chaos! Madness!
Calm down. Lawyers are lovers of order and prone to see disaster
in the slightest degree of disagreement, disequilibrium, and disorder.
A multiplicity of voices is not the end of the world. It is simply a
decentralized approach to constitutional interpretation. Decentraliza
tion is not chaos; it is simply the antithesis of centralized interpretive
authority. It is an example of "checks and balances." If there is one
thing we know about the Framers, it is that they feared the concentra
tion of power and sought to prevent it in the design of the
Constitution. Would it not be somewhat ironic (and quite unlikely) for
the Framers, so concerned with the division and dispersal of power
generally, to have concentrated the power to interpret all other powers
and to bind all other actors with those interpretations in a single insti
tution or organ of government? Marbury certainly suggests no such
thing; practically every sentence of the opinion points in precisely the
opposite direction. The power of constitutional interpretation - the
power, in Marbury's sonorous words, "to say what the law is" - is not
vested in a single, authoritative body, but, like any other power too
important to place in a single set of hands, is a divided, shared power.
Division and shared responsibility admits of the possibility of
disagreement, competing interpretations, ongoing tension, struggle,
compromise (or deadlock), and lack of a definitive resolution. In other
words, it admits of - indeed, virtually assures - exactly what separa,
tion of powers is designed to produce as a general proposition. Over
time, and across a broad range of issues, such an arrangement tends to
produce a kind of general equilibrium - not perfect stability or
repose, but general equilibrium. (Does a regime of judicial supremacy
really do any better than that?) Rough stability in the law is achieved,
under such a model, not by the edicts of a centralized authority, but by
the pull and tug of competing interpreters and competing interpreta-

89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch) 137, 178 ( 1 803).
90. Id.
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tions, none of whom is bound by the views of the others and each of
whom, armed with separate powers and overlapping spheres of
authority, may press the interpretation it thinks is truest to the
Constitution. Often, this will produce a core of consensus. It will also
often produce a periphery of uncertainty, especially as to issues on
which there is no agreed correct resolution. But that is as it should be.
Where an issue remains genuinely contested, and the several branches
of government legitimately and in good faith continue to disagree, the
issue should remain unsettled.
E.

Interpretive Methodology

Ah, you say, but there's the rub: All of this assumes legitimate
disagreement, good faith interpretive differences, genuine disputes
over constitutional meaning. What if one branch, or body, advances a
highly idiosyncratic interpretation, not remotely supportable by fair
reasoning from the Constitution, and insists, for its own policy or
self-interested purposes, on pressing such a position to the wall?
Decentralization permits a whole array of opportunities for bizarre,
potentially destructive interpretive methodologies by any of a number
of actors.
Put to one side for a moment the obvious possibility that a single
authoritative interpreter might do exactly the same thing, but without
any other authority supplying an effective check on such interpretive
abuse. Also put to one side that this possibility might well be thought
by many a fair characterization of the actual practice of the modern
Supreme Court under the Myth of Marbury. The rhetorical force of
this concern lies in the perception that the notion of "interpretation"
permits the Interpreter to bend the Constitution to his will; and that,
consequently, the only way to constrain the results is to designate an
authoritative interpreter who can slap down everybody else, and to
choose the branch or body least likely to be willful in its own interpre
tations.
Marbury rejects this approach in two ways. First, as already
discussed, it eschews the single-authoritative-interpreter approach
entirely, resting instead on constitutional supremacy and the absurdity
(and immorality) of binding one actor with the unconstitutional acts of
another. The second point is more subtle, but it is implicit throughout
Marshall's analysis: the whole idea that the Constitution is supreme
and that one actor cannot be bound by the unconstitutional action of
another presupposes that there is some objective meaning to the
Constitution that stands on its own, apart from the interpretations
or applications of that document by any particular actor. The
Constitution means what it means. When Marshall uses the hypotheti
cal of a treason conviction based on the testimony of one, rather than
two, witnesses to the same overt act, he is supposing that the meaning
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of the provision in question is something that exists independently of
the interpretation offered by some person or institution, so that any
objective observer might be able to judge that the person or institution
doing the interpreting just plain got it wrong. The words and phrases
of the Constitution have discernible, objective meaning. They are not
empty vessels waiting ·to have content poured into them by an
Interpreter. Without such an understanding of constitutional meaning,
Marbury simply makes no sense.
Marbury, I submit, assumes that the proper way - the only proper
way - to read the Constitution is to give the words, phrases, and
structures of the text the ordinary, natural or (occasionally)
specialized meaning they would have had, in context, to reasonably
informed readers and speakers of the English language in America, at
the time those words and phrases were employed.91 Marshall does not
say this in so many words, but it is implicit in every step he takes and
every move he makes. The idea that the powers of and limitations on
government are written is vitally important, says Marshall, at innumer
able points in Marbury.
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. . . .
Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate
them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be, that an act of
the legislature repugnant to the constitution, is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is conse
quently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental princi
ples of our society. It is not therefore to be lost sight of in the further
consideration of this subject. . . .
[To maintain] that courts must close their eyes on the constitution . . .
would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions . . . . That it
thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement
on political institutions - a written constitution - would of itself be suffi
cient, in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so
much reverence, for rejecting the construction . . . . [C]ourts, as well as
other departments, are bound by that instrument.92

91 . For a defense of this methodology as the proper approach to constitutional interpre
tation, see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the
Constitution 's Secret Drafting History, 92 GEO L.J. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Kesavan
& Paulsen, The Interpretive Force]; see also Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, ls
West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291, 398-99 (2002) [hereinafter Kesavan &
Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?].
92. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-78, 180 (emphasis added).
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More than that, it is this very writtenness of the Constitution that, in
supplies both the basis for judicial review and the standard
for judging whether another branch has departed from the
Constitution. The paramount authority of the written text is the core of

Marbury,

the argument for the power of judicial review and the controlling stan

quite simply, stands
for textualism as the proper method of constitutional interpretation.93
We tend to forget or ignore this, because we are imprisoned by the
Myth of Marbury. The myth of judicial supremacy tends to generate
the corollary myth of plenary power over interpretive method.
Because what the Court says controls, there is no control over what
the Court says. The Court's power "to say what the law is" becomes
"the law is what the Court says it is. "94 Whatever the Court says, goes.
What Marbury says, however, is that whatever the Constitution
says, goes. The courts don't get to say whatever they want. They are
"bound by that instrument."95 There remains, of course, the enduring
question about how to interpret that instrument - how to give effect
to the authority of the written text - but that is a question to be
answered by a different article.96 For present purposes, it is sufficient
here to note that the actual opinion in Marbury, as distinct from the
myth that has grown up around it, rejects modern notions of interpre
tive freedom or interpretive license. The text strictly constrains what

dard for the practice of judicial ,review. Marbury,

93. Two refinements: first, "textualism" - the authority of the written text - in
Marbury's argument for judicial review includes arguments from the logic of the constitu
tional structure created by the text. In other words, textualism embraces not only specific
words and phrases, but the architecture of the text as well. Marbury is clearly all about the
structure and architecture created by the written text, as well as specific provisions. Second,
to say that Marbury embraces textualism as the appropriate interpretive method in constitu
tional law is not to say that Marshall's analysis of the constitutional text is sound, in all re
spects, throughout the opinion - for example, with respect to his holding that Section 13 of
the Judiciary Act violates Article I I I of the Constitution. See Paulsen, Marbury's Wrongness,
supra note 17. Textualism can be the correct method of interpreting the Constitution and
still admit of some sharp disagreements as to the proper result to be reached by employing
that method in any particular case.
94. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, NY
(May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, GOVERNOR OF
NEW YORK, 1906 - 1908 at 139 (1908) ("We are under a Constitution. . . . The Constitution
is what the judges say it is.").
95. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180.
96. Fortunately, Vasan Kesavan and I have written the article that answers that
question ( !). Kesavan & Paulsen, The Interpretive Force, supra note 91. The correct answer,
we submit, is that the Constitution itself (in Article Vi's specification of "[tjhis Constitution"
as the supreme law of the land, see U.S. CONST. art. VI (Supremacy Clause) (emphasis
added), and the nature of written constitutionalism generally), requires a methodology of
original, objective-public-meaning textualism. By that we mean the following: The
Constitution should be interpreted according to the meaning the words and phrases em
ployed would have had, considered in historical context and within the context of the docu
ment as a whole, to an ordinary, reasonably informed reader or speaker of the English lan
guage in the relevant political community at the time the text was adopted as law. See also
Kesavan & Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, supra note 91, at 398-99.
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may with propriety be done in the name of the Constitution. And if
what is done in the name of the Constitution is not consistent with the
text, fidelity to "that instrument" requires fidelity to the text, and not
what has been wrongly done in its name.
Thus, what seems to scare sensible people about coordinate and
decentralized constitutional interpretation is that the interpreters
might think themselves properly possessed of Marbury-Myth-like
interpretive license to do whatever they like - that they might think
that their equal power to say what the law is means that whatever they
say, or whatever they can get away with saying, goes. But is that not
something of a straw man? If, after all, what is being objected to is the
theory of decentralized constitutional interpretive power, flowing from
the logic of Marbury's argument for judicial review, should not one be
required to challenge that theory on grounds consistent with
Marbury's other assumptions about how interpretive power is legiti
mately to be employed?
To be sure, a "presidential activist" in constitutional interpretation
is a dangerous constitutional loose cannon. To be sure, a state gov
ernment that feels free to interpret the Constitution in a manner cut
loose from the constraints of the objective, original meaning of the
text's words and phrases is a dangerous centripetal force. To be sure, if
Congress cares not about the document itself, but decides,
Humpty-Dumpty-like, that words mean whatever Congress wants
them to mean, we could see a great fall. As I have written elsewhere:
The more that interpretive power is conjoined with practical governing
power, the more important it is that interpretive power be constrained by
the relatively clear boundaries of text, intention, and structure. 97

If one is to shed the Myth of Marbury, one must shed it completely. If
one is to embrace Marbury in all its implications, one must embrace
those implications fully. And if one does so, that is a constitutional
world in which multiple actors, exercising their independent interpre
tive power, strive in good faith to check one another and hold each
other to the meaning of the words of the Constitution's text, and to
guard against departures from the nation's paramount law by any of
the branches or organs of federal or state government. What a
wonderful, wonderful world that would be.
IV. CODA
Alas, that is not the constitutional world we inhabit today. Instead,
we live in a constitutional world in which the Supreme Court is sultan
and a perversion of Marbury v. Madison is our governing constitu
tional myth. The myth is, by now, an ingrained one. The Supreme

97. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 1 1 , at 342.
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Court lives by the myth. The political branches by and large have
accepted it.98 And it has been taught as Holy Writ to several genera
tions of elementary school and law school students. Disentangling our
political culture from the Myth of Marbury is not a mere day's work.
On this, the occasion of Marbury's 200th anniversary, however, it
is worth reflecting on the fact that The Myth is a betrayal of
everything that Marbury stands for, and a betrayal of the written
Constitution that Marbury identifies as the appropriate object of·
veneration.

98. See Paulsen, Nixon Now, supra note 12, at 1358-59 ("The judiciary's assertion of
hegemony does not make it so, of course . . . . Unfortunately, however, acceptance of the
judiciary's assertion of hegemony by the other branches tends to validate such hegemony as
a practical matter.").

